Introduction
The Employment Act of 1946 set as the goal of government economic policy the maintenance of reasonably full employment and stable prices. Yet, nearly 50 years later, economists seem strangely unsure about what to tell policymakers to do to end recessions. One source of this uncertainty is confusion about how macroeconomic policies have actually been used to combat recessions. In the midst of the most recent recession, one heard opinions of fiscal policy ranging from the view that no recession has ever ended without fiscal expansion to the view that fiscal stimulus has always come too late. Similarly, for monetary policy there was disagreement about whether looser policy has been a primary engine of recovery from recessions or whether it has been relatively unimportant in these periods. This paper seeks to fill in this gap in economists ' knowledge by analyzing what has ended the eight recessions that have occurred in the United States since 1950. In particular, it analyzes whether monetary and fiscal policies have helped or hindered previous recoveries. By quantifying the role of policy, the paper seeks to identify how much of recoveries is attributable to government action and how much to other factors such as self-correction and fortuitous shocks. By determining which policies were the most effective in ending past recessions, the paper tries to discern the likely efficacy of policy today and in recessions to come.
Our main finding is that monetary policy has been the source of most postwar recoveries. While limited fiscal actions have occurred around most troughs, these actions have almost always been too small to contribute much to economic recovery. In contrast, monetary policy has typically moved toward expansion shortly after the start of most recessions and appears to have contributed, on average, almost two percentage points to real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the four quarters following the trough. Even if one accounts for the fact that tight monetary policy before the peak continues to depress the economy for several years, the net effect of monetary policy in ending recessions has been substantial.
We reach this conclusion through a series of steps. Section 2 analyzes the record of policy actions since 1950. It shows that both nominal and real interest rates fell by several percentage points before most troughs. In contrast, the ratio of the high-employment surplus to trend GDP typically fell slightly around troughs, but only rarely moved more than a percentage point.
Section 3 analyzes the sources of these policy changes. It examines the stated motivations of policymakers to see if the changes in interest rates and in the high-employment surplus during recessions and around troughs were taken largely to end the recessions or for other reasons. We find that nearly all of the monetary changes and most of the fiscal changes were genuinely antirecessionary. Interestingly, we find that many of the largest discretionary fiscal actions taken in the postwar era, such as the 1964 tax cut and the Nixon "New Economic Policy," were not antirecessionary measures, but expansionary actions taken when policymakers were dissatisfied with the pace of growth.
Section 4 examines the likely effects of the antirecessionary actions we identify. Using estimates of the effects of policy both from our own regressions and from Data Resources Incorporated's forecasting model, we estimate the contributions of monetary and fiscal policy to recessions and recoveries. Although there is substantial variation in the estimates of policies' impact, the results suggest that monetary policy has been crucial in ending recessions, while fiscal policy has contributed very little.1 Section 5 investigates two additional issues raised by our analysis. The first issue is the overall stabilization record of policy. We argue that there is little evidence that discretionary policy has had a large stabilizing influence, and that there are several important episodes in which -6 1 9 5 1 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 5 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 3
Although it is useful to separate out the automatic changes in the surplus that are caused by economic activity from the discretionary changes, the automatic changes are nevertheless interesting. It is certainly possible, for example, that automatic stabilizers are important to recoveries. For this reason we also examine the change in the ratio of the automatic surplus to trend GDP; we measure the automatic component of the surplus simply as the difference between the actual surplus and the high-employment surplus.6 Table 1 reports the behavior of the federal funds rate during recessions-specifically, from the times of peaks in real GDP to the quarter after troughs.' The top half of Table 1 shows the change in the nominal rate; the bottom half shows the change in the real rate. Table 1 shows that interest rates fall sharply in recessions. The falls in the nominal funds rate are particularly consistent: 28 of the 33 entries in the top portion of Table 1 are negative. The only significant exception to the pattern of falling nominal rates occurred in 1974, when the Federal Reserve moved to sharply tighter policy even though real 6. For the actual budget surplus, we use the National Income and Product Accounts measure of the federal surplus. 7. Because our focus is on movements in aggregate output, we use the dates of the peaks and troughs in real GDP rather than National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) peaks and troughs. The two sets of dates are very similar, however.
RESULTS

Monetary Policy
output was falling. Even during this recession, however, the overall movement in the funds rate was a large decline. The average decline between the peak in output and one quarter after the trough is 3.4 percentage points. For comparison, the standard deviation of movements in the nominal funds rate for the full sample is 1.0 percentage point for one-quarter changes, and 2.3 percentage points for four-quarter changes. Thus, the declines in recessions are large. The bottom half of Table 1 shows that real interest rates also fell during these recessions. In all eight episodes, the estimated real rate fell between the peak and the quarter after the trough. The declines in the real rate are somewhat smaller and less consistent than the falls in the nominal rate, however. For example, the average decline is just slightly over 2 percentage points.8 Once a recovery has begun, there is a moderate tendency for both the nominal and real funds rates to rise. Table 2 shows the changes in the nominal and real federal funds rates in the second through fifth quarters after troughs. About two-thirds of these entries are positive, 8 . Section 4.3 shows that the declines in output, prices, and expected inflation during recessions relative to their normal behavior would have caused only modest falls in nominal interest rates, and essentially no change in real rates, if the Federal Reserve had kept the money growth rate fixed in the face of these movements. Thus, even if we adopted measures of monetary policy that did not attribute these parts of changes in interest rates to policy, we would still find that monetary policy was the source of the bulk of the interest rate declines.
with an average rise of both the nominal and the real rate during these periods of about 1 percentage point. And although the relevant numbers are not reported in the tables, the same general tendency toward moderate interest rate increases continues through the second year of recoveries. Table 2 also shows that the 1991 experience is quite unusual. Rather than rising as is typical, both real and nominal rates fell substantially after the trough. This examination of movements in interest rates suggests that monetary policy could play a critical role in recoveries: There are large, consistent declines in interest rates during recessions. Whether these declines reflect deliberate countercyclical policy, and whether their timing and magnitude are consistent with the view that they are important in recoveries, are questions that we address in the next two sections. Table 3 reports the change in the ratio of the high-employment surplus to trend GDP from peaks to five quarters after troughs. These data do not show any pattern of discretionary fiscal policy as consistent or strong as the declines in interest rates in recessions. The average cumulative change in the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio from the peak to one quarter after the trough is -0.7 percentage points. However, there is great variation around this average, with some cumulative changes being large and positive, and others being large and negative. To put the average change in perspective, the standard deviation of movements in the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio for the full sample is 0.6 percentage points for one-quarter changes and 1.1 percentage point for four-quarter changes. Thus, the average fall during recessions is not large relative to typical movements in the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio.
Fiscal Policy
To the extent that there is any systematic pattern in deliberate fiscal policy, it is that policy is generally expansionary around troughs. For example, in every recession except the one immediately after the Korean War, the ratio of the high-employment surplus to GDP fell between two quarters before the trough and the quarter after the trough; 19 of the 24 individual changes for these quarters were negative. The overall shifts over these three quarters were generally about 1% of GDP. Thus, it does appear that fiscal policy becomes slightly expansionary late in recessions.
The record of automatic fiscal policy is decidedly more promising than that of discretionary fiscal policy. Table 4 shows the change in the automatic surplus to GDP ratio around the eight troughs since 1950. As would be expected, the automatic surplus to GDP ratio consistently What Ends Recessions?
? 21 declines during recessions. These automatic falls in the surplus are moderately large; the average cumulative decline in the automatic surplus to GDP ratio from the peak to the quarter after the trough is 1.6 percentage points. For comparison, the standard deviation of changes in the automatic surplus to GDP ratio is 0.3 percentage points for one-quarter changes and 0.9 percentage point for four-quarter changes. This simple examination of the data suggests that automatic fiscal policy is more likely to have affected recoveries than has discretionary policy. Unless the effects of modest changes in deliberate fiscal policy are large, or there are consistently important shifts in fiscal policy that are not reflected in the high-employment surplus, discretionary fiscal policy cannot have played a central role in ending downturns or in creating strong recoveries. On the other hand, the automatic movements in the surplus during recessions may be large enough and consistent enough to have significantly affected the path of real output following troughs. Despite this negative conclusion on the overall movement of discretionary fiscal policy during recessions, the finding that discretionary fiscal policy is consistently expansionary around troughs is intriguing. If these expansions are in fact responses to economic conditions, they would suggest that deliberate fiscal policy may play some role in recoveries. More important, they raise the possibility that if such expansions were only undertaken more aggressively, fiscal policy could be a significant countercyclical tool. The key issues are the motives for the shifts in policy, the reasons they are not larger, and the timing of their effects. It is to these issues that we now turn. Table 5 is that monetary policy typically changes toward an emphasis on real growth very soon after the peak in real GDP. Without exception, the change in the Boschen-Mills index is positive within two quarters of the peak. In many cases the change occurs concurrent with or even slightly before the peak in output. This pattern obviously parallels the finding in Section 2 that interest rates fall soon after the peak in most cases. The behavior of the Boschen-Mills index indicates that the Federal Reserve typically responds to weakness in the economy quite rapidly and that the declines in interest rates are generally the result of deliberate monetary policy. While the Federal Reserve was quick to worry about recession, it was fairly slow to realize that a recession was actually in progress during the fall of 1990. In October the FOMC believed that "the available data do not point to cumulating weakness and the onset of a recession" (1990, p. 139). They nevertheless felt that "an easing move was warranted in light of indications that there was a significant risk of a much weaker economy" (1990, p. 141). Not until November did a consensus develop that "the most likely outcome was a relatively mild and brief downturn" (1990, p. 148). At this point, the FOMC voted for some slight immediate easing of reserve conditions and indicated that "the growing signs of a softening economy... suggested that the Committee should remain alert.., to signals that some further easing was appropriate" (1990, p. 149). Thus it appears that, although the falls in interest rates throughout 1990 were motivated by movements in real output, only those after November 1990 were truly antirecessionary. In most instances the Federal Reserve responded to the weakening economy by increasing reserves immediately. This suggests that the declines in interest rates during recessions documented in Section 2 were at least partly the result of antirecessionary monetary policy. In those instances where policymakers did not cut interest rates in response to the weakening of the economy, it was typically because some other factor, such as inflation or balance of payments difficulties, was thought to necessitate tight policy.
Lessons from Postwar Monetary
The fact that the Boschen and Mills index of Federal Reserve intentions shows a move toward inflation control soon after the start of most recoveries is also important. It suggests that most periods of high inflation are not the result of antirecessionary monetary policy carried too far. Rather, they are more likely the result of expansionary policies taken for reasons unrelated to recessions or of insufficient shifts toward combating inflation once recoveries have begun. Thus, policy mistakes are not an inherent feature of antirecessionary monetary policy. minor spending bills passed in July 1958 were also taken at least partly in response to the state of the economy (Bartlett, 1993 Despite its name, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 appears not to have been motivated by the recession. The 1982 Economic Report states that "the major elements of the Administration's economic policy are designed to increase long-term growth and to reduce inflation.
FISCAL POLICY
Uniformly favorable near-term effects were not expected" (1982, p. 24). It specifically identifies the Economic Recovery Tax Act as one of those long-term policies, and the short-term stimulatory effects are never mentioned (1982, p. 44). Even the 1984 Economic Report only mentions the aggregate demand effects of the tax cut in the context of discussing why the deficit is not an immediate danger to the economy (1984, p. 39).
There is similarly little emphasis on the short-term stimulatory effects of the increase in defense expenditures. The 1982 Economic Report makes it clear that national security was the main motive behind the spending program when it states that "any economic effects, however, 1990 The most recent recession began in the second quarter of 1990 and ended in the first quarter of 1991. Fiscal policy was essentially unchanged during the recession. One explanation for this absence of discretionary fiscal policy is that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act had been passed in November 1990. Given its stress on "credible and systematic" policies (1991, p. 4), the Bush administration did not want to change fiscal policy so soon after the budget agreement.19 The only significant fiscal action proposed in 1991 was a cut in the tax rate on long-term capital gains, and this measure was defeated in Congress. According to the 1993 Economic Report, "when the need for a fiscal policy that would provide immediate stimulus became increasingly clear in late 1991," the Bush administration proposed several small fiscal changes (1993, p. 51). Among the measures taken were executive actions to reduce personal income tax withholding and to accelerate the spending of previously appropriated Federal funds. Legislation to reduce the capital gains tax, to provide for a temporary investment tax allowance, to enhance depreciation for certain companies, and to provide for a temporary tax credit for first-time homebuyers was also proposed. None of these programs were very large, however, and none were passed by Congress. that the small falls in the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio around troughs documented in Section 2 were mainly the result of antirecessionary policy. The nature of these rapid spending changes, however, provides insight into why the changes were almost always quite small. The spending increases have typically been limited to actions that can be taken without congressional approval, such as the acceleration of planned spending or tax refunds, or to actions for which congressional approval is easy to obtain, such as the extension or expansion of unemployment insurance benefits. Since the number of such actions is inherently limited by the structure of the U.S. government, it would be unrealistic to infer from the modest increases in spending around postwar troughs that equally rapid but more aggressive fiscal responses were possible.
The 1981 Economic Report emphasizes that the fall in the high
Lessons from Postwar Fiscal
The postwar record on major legislated antirecessionary actions is complicated. There are no examples of major spending changes undertaken in response to recessions. There are, however, 'two times when taxes were cut in response to recessions: 1953 and 1975. (Taxes were also cut during the 1981 recession, but there is no evidence that this cut was motivated by the cyclical condition of the economy.) But both tax cuts were unusual in ways that may limit their relevance to other recessions. In 1953, the tax cut had already been passed before the recession began; all Eisenhower had to do was not ask that it be delayed. In 1975, the recession was particularly long; it had already been going on for over a year before any policy action was taken. A more positive interpretation of the 1975 experience, however, is that in response to a particularly severe recession, effective measures can eventually be taken. Consistent with this positive interpretation is the fact that the lag between when the tax cut was officially proposed and when the first rebate actually appeared was only five months.
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from this analysis is that most large fiscal actions have been taken in response to slow recoveries rather than to actual recessions. The 1964 tax cut, Nixon's "New Economic Policy," and Carter's tax cut and spending increases were all passed to increase growth in a sluggish but basically healthy economy. This fact is significant because the potential for policy mistakes, for overheating the economy and generating inflation, is much higher for such policies than for those passed in the depth of recession.
Finally, the record of the specific actions taken in response to recessions suggests that focusing on the high-employment surplus is likely to lead, if anything, to overestimates of the extent of antirecessionary fiscal stimulus. Most of the actions took the form of temporary tax cuts, temporary changes in transfers, and changes in the timing of disbursements, all of which may have much smaller effects than long-lasting changes in purchases or taxes.
The Contribution of Macroeconomic Policies to Recoveries
As Sichel (1992) and Beaudry and Koop (1993) document, recessions are typically followed by periods of very rapid growth. For the eight recessions since 1950, real growth in the four quarters after the trough has averaged 4.6%, and has exceeded the average annual postwar growth rate of 2.75% in every recovery except the current one.21 In this section we attempt to measure the contribution of policy to this spurt of rapid growth following troughs. In particular, we ask whether in the absence of policy actions, output growth after troughs would have continued to be negative, been equal to its average postwar value, or been even higher than it actually was.
To measure the role of policy, it is clearly not enough to just establish how monetary and fiscal policy changed during recessions and recoveries; we also need estimates of the magnitude and timing of the policies' effects. Therefore, in this section we construct such estimates and analyze their implications. We do not attempt to shed new light on the underlying question of whether monetary and fiscal policy have real effects. For this exercise we take it as given that policy affects output, and seek to provide plausible estimates of the size of those effects.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF POLICY
4.1.1 Baseline Policies Any description of how policies have affected the course of the economy must compare the economy's actual behavior with how it would have behaved if policies had followed some baseline paths. Thus, the analysis requires specifying baseline policies. We take as our baselines a constant real federal funds rate and a constant ratio of the high-employment surplus to trend GDP. Thus, we are attempting to estimate the contributions of changes in the real funds rate and in the ratio of the high-employment surplus to trend GDP to the path of real output.
These baseline policies are approximately feasible. Unpredictable movements in expected inflation, and in receipts and expenditures for a given level of activity, make it impossible for policymakers to keep the real funds rate and the high-employment surplus to trend GDP ratio exactly constant. On a quarterly basis, however, these shocks are likely to be small. This would not be true of some other potential baselines; quarterly shocks to the money supply and to the unadjusted deficit, for example, appear to be large.
Over the longer term, there is no reason that fiscal policy cannot keep the high-employments surplus to trend GDP ratio roughly constant. Monetary policy, on the other hand, cannot keep the real interest rate above or below its long-term equilibrium level indefinitely without causing unbounded deflation or inflation. But movements in the sustainable level of the real interest rate are likely to be gradual. Thus, attributing movements in the real interest rate that are in fact due to changes in its sustainable level to changes in monetary policy will not have a large effect on the analysis of the sources of short-run output movements.22
Approaches to Estimating the Effects of Policy
We estimate the effects of monetary and fiscal policy in three ways. The first two approaches are based on simple regressions, and the third is based on a large macroeconomic model. Our first regression is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of real GDP growth on eight lags of the change in our estimate of the real federal funds rate and on the current and eight lags of the change in the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio. We also include a constant, a dummy variable for the post-1973 period (to account for the productivity growth slowdown), and eight lags of the dependent variable.23
The OLS estimates are likely to provide conservative estimates of the effects of changes in the real interest rate. Most importantly, if the Federal Reserve changes the real funds rate on the basis of information about future output movements beyond that contained in the right-hand 22. This would not be true if we took a constant nominal funds rate as our baseline.
Attempting to peg the nominal rate at an unsustainable level would lead to accelerating changes in inflation, the real rate, and output. Thus, the effect of changes in the nominal rate is explosive. As a result, attributing shifts in the nominal rate that are in fact due to changes in its sustainable level to changes in monetary policy would have very large effects on the analysis of the sources of output movements. 23. We exclude the current value of the change in the real funds rate on the grounds that the real rate is likely to respond to output movements within the quarter. Since this appears less likely with the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio, we include the contemporaneous value of that variable. Treating the two policy variables symmetrically has little effect on the results, however.
side variables of the regression, the changes in the real rate will be positively correlated with the error term. As a result, the OLS estimates will be biased upward (that is, toward zero). Since, as Section 3 describes, monetary policy responds very rapidly to economic developments, this effect is likely be to present to some extent. Similarly, any additional information that consumers have about future output movements will cause the real rate to rise before increases in output, again biasing the OLS estimates of the effects of changes in the real rate toward zero. Contemporaneous interaction between changes in the real rate and output growth has more complex effects on the OLS estimates. Since simple examples suggest that such interaction is likely also to bias the estimates toward zero, and since the reaction of output to the real interest rate within the quarter is likely to be small in any event, this effect is unlikely to reverse the effects of the other biases.24
Thus, the OLS estimates seem much more likely to understate than overstate the effects of changes in the real funds rate. Since there are important sources of variation in real interest rates, such as concern about inflation and political considerations, that are not likely to be substantially correlated with sources of output movements not included in the regression, the bias may not be serious. And for fiscal policy, where major policy shifts appear to require at least several quarters to implement, and where there are many important sources of variation in policy other than economic conditions, significant correlation with the error term appears unlikely. Thus, for fiscal policy the bias from using OLS is likely to be small.
Because of the potential bias of the OLS estimates, our second set of estimates of policies' effects are derived from instrumental variables (IV) estimation of the regression just described, with the changes in the real rate treated as endogenous. As instruments, we employ the Romer and Romer (1989, 1994) reduce inflation from its current level. Because these policy shifts to combat inflation appear to be largely the result of changes in tastes, and not responses to additional information about future output movements, the index should be essentially uncorrelated with the error term of the regression. Thus, the Romer and Romer dates should allow the IV regression to estimate the output effects of interest rate changes. The Boschen-Mills index described in the previous section is a less-than-ideal instrument because Boschen and Mills do not distinguish Federal Reserve actions that are independent of the economy from those that are responses to the predicted behavior of the economy. However, if one believes that most changes in stated Federal Reserve intentions represent independent policy shifts, then this index is a useful instrument for isolating the effects of policy-generated changes in interest rates.
Both the OLS and IV regressions are estimated over the period 1957:2 to 1988:4; the sample period is dictated by the availability of the Boschen-Mills index. To drive policy multipliers from these regressions, we use the coefficient estimates to calculate the dynamic multipliers for a one-percentage-point fall in the real federal funds rate and a one-percentage-point fall in the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio.
Our third set of estimates of policies' effects are from the Data Resources Incorporated (DRI) model of the U.S. economy. Using a large macroeconomic model has the advantage that it incorporates a great deal of information and judgment. It has the disadvantages, however, that it is much less transparent than the regressions and that its implications may reflect the model builders' priors rather than characteristics of the data. For monetary policy, the experiment we consider in the model is a permanent one-percentage-point change in the real federal funds rate with the parameters governing fiscal policy held fixed. For fiscal policy, we consider a permanent change in personal income taxes of 1% of GDP with the real funds rate held fixed.25 Figure 3 shows the multipliers for monetary policy implied by the two regressions and by the DRI model. The OLS regression implies that a permanent one-percentage-point fall in the real funds rate raises real GDP by 1.7%. Most of this effect comes between the second and fifth quarters after the increase. As one would expect, the IV regression implies a somewhat larger impact. The overall effect is now a 25. For fiscal policy, we also investigated averaging the multipliers for a change in taxes with those for a change in government purchases. This resulted in a considerably larger effect in the quarter of the policy change and had little effect thereafter. Because most major postwar antirecessionary fiscal actions have taken the form of changes in taxes and transfers, we focus on the multipliers for a change in taxes. coming between one and four quarters after the change. Figure 4 shows the estimated multipliers for fiscal policy. The OLS regression implies that a permanent fall of one percentage point in the ratio of the high-employment surplus to trend GDP raises output by 1.1%. The effect occurs gradually over about 10 quarters. The IV estimates imply that the effects of lowering the surplus to GDP ratio are small and irregular. Taken literally, the estimates imply that fiscal policy has essentially no effects. However, because the standard errors are large, the IV regression does not provide strong evidence against conventional views of the effects of fiscal policy. For example, the two standard error confidence interval for the sum of the coefficients on the surplus to GDP ratio is (-1.59, 1.70); for comparison, the OLS estimate is -0.74. We therefore, do not place great emphasis on the point estimates of the effects of fiscal policy from the IV regression. Finally, the DRI model implies that the effect of a fall of one percentage point in the surplus to GDP ratio on real GDP peaks after four quarters at 1.4% and then gradually declines. Table 6 summarizes the implications of these estimated multipliers for the sources of output growth in the four quarters after troughs. Specifically, for each of the three sets of multipliers, Table 6 reports the implied average contributions during these periods of macroeconomic policies and other factors. The policy contributions are divided both according to whether they reflect monetary or fiscal policy and according to whether they reflect actions before the peaks in real output or after. In addition, the contributions of fiscal policy are divided into the effects of automatic and discretionary policy. The reason for separating the effects of prepeak and postpeak policies is that the multipliers suggest that the lags in the effects of monetary policy are sufficiently long that the shifts to tighter monetary policy before peaks continue to depress growth even after troughs. Thus, what we need to understand is not simply why output growth is above normal in recoveries, but why it is above normal despite the previous monetary tightenings. Notes: The residual shows the component of the difference between mean growth in the year after troughs and average annual growth that is not accounted for by prepeak and postpeak policies. The difference between mean growth after troughs and average annual growth is 1.82 percentage points; the rows may not add to this value due to rounding.
Results
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOURCE OF RECOVERIES
All three sets of estimates imply that the reductions in real interest rates after peaks are crucial to recoveries. The OLS multipliers imply that these reductions have added an average of 1.6 percentage points to real growth during the first year of recoveries, the IV multipliers imply that they have added 3.0 percentage points, and the DRI multipliers imply that they have added 1.5 percentage points. Thus, the estimates imply that the declines in real interest rates in recessions are large enough, and their effects occur quickly enough, that they play a critical role in the rapid growth during recoveries. Since average output growth in the year following troughs is 4.6%, the OLS estimates imply that without these declines, growth in the year after troughs would average only 3.0%; the IV estimates imply that it would average just 1.6%; and the DRI estimates imply it would average only 3.1%. 27 The OLS and DRI estimates imply that discretionary fiscal expansions after peaks contribute moderately to growth (not surprisingly, the IV estimates imply that the effect is negligible). In both cases, however, the majority of the estimated effect comes from the recovery from the 1973-1975 recession. In addition, because the changes in discretionary fiscal policy in recessions have consisted disproportionately of temporary changes in taxes and transfers, the multipliers are likely to overstate their effects. Thus, discretionary fiscal policy has played at most a small role in recoveries.
Our estimates imply that automatic changes in fiscal policy are more important. As described in Section 2, there are consistent and substantial changes in the automatic component of the surplus during recessions. As a result, the OLS estimates suggest that the automatic movements in fiscal policy after peaks add an average of 0.6 percentage points to growth in the first year of recoveries, and the DRI model suggests that they add 0.9 percentage points. 27. Our calculations assume that the changes in the real funds rate resulting from the Federal Reserve's consistent responses to recessions have the same real effects as other movements in the real funds rate. This appears to be a reasonable approximation, for two reasons. First, since the Federal Reserve adjusts the real funds rate rapidly to economic developments, both the recession-related and the remaining part of movements in the real funds rate have a large unanticipated component to them. Second, for the real interest rate (in contrast to the money supply), there is no clear reason for unanticipated and anticipated changes to have very different effects. As described in Section 2, the fact that systematic Federal Reserve policy affects the nominal funds rate, together with the fact that the direction of the effect is that expansionary policy lowers the nominal rate, strongly suggests that the systematic component of policy affects the real rate as well. It is possible, of course, that a larger movement in the money supply is needed to bring about a given change in the real funds rate when the movement is the result of systematic policy; but this is not relevant to our calculations.
Together, these results imply that policies undertaken during recessions are crucial to strong recoveries. All three sets of estimates suggest that without these policies, growth during the first year of recoveries would be anemic. The OLS estimates imply that it would have averaged 2.1%, the IV estimates imply 2.0%, and the DRI estimates imply 1.4%. Our results suggest that the main source of the weak growth that would occur without the postpeak changes in policy is the monetary tightening that usually occurs before peaks. The first column of Table 6 suggests that prepeak monetary policy reduces growth in the year after troughs by roughly 1 percentage points.
Nonpolicy factors appear to have little effect on growth in the year following troughs. The final column of Table 6 shows the amount of above-average growth not accounted for by prepeak or postpeak policies. While this residual varies somewhat depending on the multipliers used, it is typically small, implying that growth would have been approximately average during the first year of recoveries in the absence of policy changes. Thus, nothing in our analysis suggests that output would continue to drop indefinitely without governmental intervention. Similarly, nothing suggests that the economy possesses strong self-correction mechanisms that would cause it to quickly make up the output losses that occur during recessions.
Considering slightly longer horizons strengthens the case that monetary policy is critical to recoveries. For example, output growth (at an annual rate) in the fifth and sixth quarters of recoveries averages only 0.1 percentage points above normal; but the OLS multipliers imply that postpeak monetary policies contribute 1.4 percentage points to annual growth in these quarters, the IV multipliers imply that they contribute 3.1 percentage points, and the DRI multipliers imply that they contribute 0.2 percentage points.28 
where mt is real money balances, yt is real income, it is the nominal interest rate, and -rrt is quarterly inflation. Equation ( To estimate the effect of the recession on interest rates when money growth is held fixed, we need measures of the falls in output, prices, and expected inflation due to the recession. We compute the fall in output between the peak and the quarter following the trough due to the recession (the A In y term in the expression above) simply as the sum of the shortfalls of quarterly output growth from its average value of 2.75%/4, or 0.69%. These values of the change in y, together with the estimates of b and c and the actual values of the nominal interest rate, imply that if the Federal Reserve did not adjust the path of the money stock, the falls in real income would reduce the nominal interest rate by an average of 0.9 percentage points over the period from the peak to one quarter after the trough.
To find the effect of the recession on the price level, we compare the actual path of the price level with what would have occurred if inflation had simply held steady at the value of expected inflation implied by our estimated real federal funds rate as of the peak quarter. These estimates imply that the increases in the real money supply coming from the declines in inflation reduce the nominal interest rate by an average of 0.6 percentage points. Thus, the textbook self-correction mechanism of downward pressure on prices increasing real money balances and, therefore, lowering interest rates accounts for only a small part of the interest rate declines during recessions.29
Finally, the estimates of expected inflation implied by our real funds rate series suggest that expected inflation declines by an average of 1.4 percentage points between the peak and the quarter after the trough. The fact that the direct effects of the declines in expected inflation more than offset the effects of the increases in the real money stock resulting from the falls in inflation is consistent with the evidence of De Long and Summers (1986) that price flexibility is on net destabilizing in the U.S. economy.
Combining these three figures, our results suggest that if the Federal Reserve were holding money growth fixed, the behavior of income, prices, and expected inflation would lead to only moderate falls in the nominal interest rate between the peak and the quarter after the trough and have essentially no effect on the real interest rate. Thus, choosing a baseline for monetary policy that takes account of these effects would not affect our conclusion that monetary policy is the primary engine of recovery from recessions.30
Stabilization and Persistence
Our analysis of the contribution of macroeconomic policy to output growth can be used to address two other issues. First, we can examine the overall role of macroeconomic policy in economic stabilization. Even if policy has contributed to recoveries, it is useful to consider its 29. An alternative way of computing the effect of the recession on the price level would be to combine the figures for the decline in output with standard estimates of the Phillips curve (for example, Gordon, 1990 effects in other periods. Second, we can investigate the extent to which the persistence of overall output movements derives from the persistence of policy changes and their effects.
THE OVERALL RECORD OF STABILIZATION POLICY
Our estimates of the contributions of policy to output growth can be used to construct estimates of what the path of real output would have been if policy had held the real interest rate and the high-employment surplus to GDP ratio constant. Figure 5 shows the implied paths of real 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 output under policies of a constant high-employment surplus to GDP ratio and a constant real funds rate, together with its actual path, for the three sets of multipliers. Since, as described earlier, monetary policy cannot in fact hold the real rate constant indefinitely, no great significance should be attached to the longer-term movements in the difference between the implied and actual paths. But the shorter-term swings can be interpreted as largely representing the effects of policy.
The OLS multipliers suggest that departures from the baseline policies have generally made recessions more severe, and recoveries more rapid, than they otherwise would have been. The estimates imply, for example, that the 1960 and 1969 recessions would not have occurred at all under the baseline policies, and that the output declines in the 1973 and 1981 recessions would have been half as large as they actually were. These estimates suggest that the one major success of active policy occurred in the last few years: Since growth has been weak despite a falling real funds rate, the estimates imply that there would have been a protracted and severe recession under the baseline policies.
The IV multipliers suggest a generally similar picture. They imply, however, that in addition to preventing a major downturn over the past few years, active policy prevented extended periods of approximately zero growth in the mid-1950s, mid-1970s, and mid-1980s. This overall record of stabilization policy suggests that policy, especially monetary policy, helped to both start and stop postwar recessions. Since both inflation control and output growth are generally considered valid goals of macroeconomic policy, it would be hard to find consensus that either of these uses of policy was inappropriate. Given that throughout most of our sample period inflation was at levels that (both at the time and in retrospect) were viewed as excessive, it is arguable that low output growth was likely to be needed at some time to reduce inflation. The only issues concern the timing and speed of disinflation. Similarly, when output growth is low and inflation is low or falling, most economists would probably agree that expansionary policy is appropriate. Thus, the tightening and loosening of policy around recessions and recoveries are hard to question.
In contrast, expansionary policy taken in face of a strong economy and of inflation that is high or rising might be generally viewed as mistaken. By this standard, three times stand out as periods when policy was overly expansionary: 1967-1968, 1972, and 1986-1987 . Growth was above normal in all three periods. Unemployment was also low to moderate in each case: 3.6% in 1967-1968, 5.5% in 1972, and 6.5% in 1986-1987. Yet both the OLS and IV multipliers imply that policy was adding considerably to real growth in all three periods. Averaged over these five years, the OLS multipliers imply that monetary policy contributed 1.2 percentage points to real growth, and discretionary fiscal policy contributed 0.5 percentage points. The same numbers for the IV multipliers are 2.4 percentage points for monetary policy and 0.2 percentage points for discretionary fiscal policy. The DRI multipliers also imply that monetary policy contributed substantially to growth in these years, with an average contribution of 0.6% per year. These multipliers imply, however, that discretionary fiscal policy had an offsetting effect of -0.7 percentage points, so that the overall contribution of policy was essentially zero. 31 The nature of the expansionary policies differed across the episodes. The 1967-1968 and 1986-1987 episodes involved moderately stimula-31. As Figure 4 shows, the DRI model implies that a decrease in the surplus to GDP ratio has a negative effect on growth beginning in the fifth quarter after the decrease. These delayed contractionary effects are the main source of the model's implication that fiscal policy reduced growth in 1967-1968, 1972, and 1986-1987 . When these effects are omitted, the DRI multipliers imply that discretionary fiscal policy contributed just -0.1 percentage points to average growth in these years. The delayed contractionary effects of fiscal policy are also the main source of the estimated moderate contribution of prepeak automatic and discretionary fiscal policy to output growth in recoveries reported in Table 6 . In the three quarters after the recession ended in the second quarter of 1970, the nominal federal funds rate fell from 7.88% to 3.86%. It fluctuated irregularly over the next year, reaching a low of 3.54% in the first quarter of 1972. Since inflation was, if anything, rising over this period, the result was that monetary policy was extremely stimulative. Despite the differences in the nature of policy across these episodes, they are united by the fact that expansionary policies stimulated an already strong economy and, thus, set up the inflation that ultimately induced later tightenings.
THE PERSISTENCE OF OUTPUT FLUCTUATIONS
A large recent literature examines the persistence of output movements. The general conclusion of this research is that quarterly changes in real GDP are highly persistent. The usual presumption in interpreting these findings, either implicit or explicit, is that output movements driven by shifts in aggregate demand will not be very persistent (see, for example, Nelson and Plosser, 1982, and Blanchard and Quah, 1989) . As a result, the conclusion that has been drawn from these studies is that supplyside disturbances must be a crucial source of fluctuations. Our examination of postwar monetary and fiscal policies and their contributions to output movements suggests that the presumption underlying this conclusion should be reexamined. There are extended periods when macroeconomic policy-particularly monetary policy-is either generally expansionary or generally contractionary. And our estimates of policies' effects imply that the impact of any given policy movement on the economy is quite protracted. Thus, monetary and fiscal policies' contributions to output movements may be highly persistent.
To examine this issue formally, we perform a bivariate experiment analogous to the univariate one performed by Campbell and Mankiw (1987a). Campbell and Mankiw estimate some simple processes for overall output growth, and then use these processes to address the question of how forecasts of the path of output should be revised in response to an output innovation. Analogously, we decompose output growth into the estimated contributions of discretionary policy and of other factors and then ask how one should revise the forecasted path of output in response to innovations in each of these two components.
Specifically, we estimate a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) using these two variables with four lags and then find the effects of shocks to each of the variables. The sum of a shock's effects on policy-related and nonpolicy-related growth represents its effect on the path of output growth. Cumulating these growth effects then gives its effect on the path of the log of total output.
The results suggest that output innovations stemming from macroeconomic policies have considerably more persistent effects than innovations coming from other sources. Consider, for example, the results when the OLS multipliers are used to estimate the component of output growth that is due to monetary policy and discretionary fiscal policy and, thus, to decompose output growth into policy and nonpolicy components. The VAR implies that the overall output effect of a 1% shock to the nonpolicy component of output peaks at 1.3% two quarters after the shock and then gradually declines. The effect returns to 1% after six quarters and is 0.7% after 12. This relatively low persistence occurs because the policy component of output growth responds negatively to the nonpolicy component: Policymakers respond to positive output innovations by tightening. The overall effect of 0.7% after 12 quarters, for example, reflects a contribution of + 1.5% from the nonpolicy component and an offsetting contribution of -0.8% from the policy component.
The results imply that independent changes in the policy component of output growth, in contrast, have extremely persistent effects. A 1% innovation raises overall output by 2.3% after 4 quarters and 2.4% after 12. This strong persistence arises both because the policy component of growth is highly serially correlated and because the nonpolicy component is essentially unresponsive to the policy component. The strong serial correlation of the policy component, in turn, stems from the facts that the estimated effects of real interest rate changes are quite protracted and that the real interest rate reverts to its mean only slowly.32 32. It is of course possible that the output effects of a shock to the policy component of output are eventually reversed. Indeed, our procedure for estimating the effects of policy imply that if shocks to the real interest rate and the surplus-to-GDP ratio are eventually completely undone, the long-run effect of a shock to the policy component of output is zero. As is well known, however, data from moderate time spans can shed little light on the effects of innovations at long horizons, and conventional estimates of the persistence of fluctuations (such as Campbell and Mankiw's) reflect effects at moderate rather than long horizons (see, for example, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1990). For that reason, we focus on the effects of innovations over several years and make no attempt to estimate their effects at very long horizons.
Using the IV and DRI multipliers to decompose output growth into the policy and nonpolicy components produces generally similar results. The IV multipliers imply that a 1% innovation to growth stemming from sources other than policy raises the level of output after 12 quarters by 0.8%, while a 1% innovation to the policy component raises output after 12 quarters by 1.9%. With the DRI multipliers, the figures are 1.2% and 2.4%. Thus, these alternative sets of multipliers continue to imply that the policy-induced output movements are considerably more persistent than other output movements.
Taken together, the results using all three sets of multipliers suggest that the source of the high degree of persistence of aggregate output fluctuations may be quite mundane. Rather than reflecting fundamental characteristics of fluctuations, it may simply reflect the fact that shifts in macroeconomic policy and their effects on the economy are often quite protracted.33
Conclusions
Our central conclusion is that monetary policy alone is a sufficiently powerful and flexible tool to end recessions. In nearly every postwar recession, policymakers have been quick to discern the onset of recession and have responded to the downturn with rapid and significant reductions in nominal and real interest rates. Plausible estimates of the size and speed of the effects of these interest rate cuts suggest that they were crucial to the subsequent recoveries.
Discretionary fiscal policy, in contrast, does not appear to have had an important role in generating recoveries. Fiscal responses to economic downturns have generally not occurred until real activity was approximately at its trough. In addition, these responses have generally been limited to moderate actions that could be undertaken without congressional approval or for which congressional approval was easy to obtain. As a result, our estimates suggest that fiscal actions have contributed only moderately to recoveries. Policymakers have succeeded in making large adjustments in fiscal policy in response to recessions only in unusual circumstances. Thus, the historical record contradicts the view that fiscal policy is essential to ending recessions or ensuring strong recoveries.
While monetary policy has been crucial to postwar recoveries, our results suggest that the overall record of discretionary monetary and 33. Our results are consistent with the findings of Campbell and Mankiw (1987b) that the component of output movements that is correlated with movements in the unemployment rate is at least as persistent as general output fluctuations. West (1988) shows that a largely conventional model can imply that fluctuations driven by aggregate demand movements are relatively persistent.
fiscal policy is less impressive. One apparent error that has been made on several occasions is for policymakers to become overly concerned about the possibility of weak growth during expansions or excessively optimistic concerning the prospects for expansion without triggering inflation and, therefore, to adopt excessively expansionary policies. The common pattern during recoveries is for there to be modest increases in interest rates and little change in the high-employment surplus. However, in periods where policymakers have been concerned about low growth, they have often undertaken major fiscal expansions or have kept nominal interest rates constant or declining in the face of rising inflation. On several occasions, such expansionary policies appear to have contributed substantially to above normal growth. Finally, our analysis of the effects of policy may help to explain the persistence of movements in aggregate output. We find that the large degree of persistence of movements in real GDP appears to result to a considerable extent from extremely high persistence of the contribution of policy changes. Thus, policy is not only the source of postwar recoveries, but also the source of the puzzling serial correlation in aggregate output.
